1. The near-term global economic outlook remains challenging. The financial crisis has evolved into a broader economic crisis, triggered by a freeze in credit markets, large wealth erosion, and a loss of confidence. As a result, private demand is falling sharply across the world. The IMF cut its forecast for global growth for 2009 by ¾ percentage point to 2.2% last November, but with the situation having deteriorated further over the past two months, another downward revision to the outlook will be made when the next World Economic Outlook Update is published later this month.
2. Against this background, 2009 is going to be a very difficult year for Kazakhstan’s economy. Lower oil and commodity prices, adverse conditions in international financial markets, and developments in Russia are negatively affecting confidence, credit availability, and foreign exchange inflows. We expect economic growth to slow further this year to 1%, before recovering modestly during 2010, while inflation is expected to continue to ease. After recording a large surplus in 2008, the current account is projected to swing into deficit this year as export earnings fall.
3. The government has pro-actively introduced a set of policies under its Anti-Crisis Programme to help mitigate economic vulnerabilities and establish a basis for the resumption of strong growth. In these endeavors, it has benefited from the prudent policy stance it followed in earlier years which meant that Kazakhstan entered the current difficult period with a large fiscal surplus, low public debt, and a substantial stock of foreign currency assets. We generally support the policy strategy the government is following, although the prompt and effective implementation of the measures will be the key to their success. In turn, this will require all parties (government, banks, companies, and the general public) to work together. Our views on the key policy issues are set out below.
4. A comprehensive strategy is needed to identify and address vulnerabilities in the banking sector. The starting point should be a full evaluation of the current financial situation of the major banks. While input from external experts will be helpful, the FSA should remain at the center of this process. An appropriate policy response, including recapitalization and other needed measures, can then be determined on the basis of this assessment. We welcome the ongoing work of the FSA to strengthen its assessments of the major banks, and concur with them that banks should raise provisioning levels substantially in the current environment of deteriorating loan quality and falling collateral values. In addition, we believe that a full and transparent accounting of the assets held by banks overseas and their ability to generate foreign currency liquidity, the extent of connected lending in bank portfolios, and the links between banks and pension funds is also necessary. Generally, more intensive supervision of banks (particularly those that are frequent users of NBK liquidity or are receiving large government capital injections) is needed to assess ongoing developments and ensure that business plans are put in place to address existing operational weaknesses. To achieve this heightened supervision, it is important that the FSA has the independence and resources available to it to carry out its mandate.
5. With the construction-banking nexus at the heart of many of Kazakhstan’s economic difficulties, we support the government’s plans to intervene to help complete unfinished construction projects. However, this support should not bailout insolvent construction companies. Otherwise, adjustment in the sector will be prolonged and there is a risk that banks will continue to lend money to unviable companies. It will also be important that plans to offer mortgages at below-market interest rates have adequate safeguards built-in. In particular, they should only be available for the purchase of primary residences, and borrowers should meet appropriate loan qualification standards. More generally, bonds that will be issued by Samruk-Kazyna to finance part of the anti-crisis programme should be offered to interested investors through the capital market.
6. Macroeconomic policies can continue to provide support to the economy, but they must not over-reach.
8. The government has announced that one of its top priorities this year is to limit the increase in unemployment. With economic growth set to remain weak and financial conditions difficult, an increase in layoffs from existing companies will unfortunately be unavoidable in the period ahead. Attempting to prevent this adjustment, either through restrictive trade policies or other means, is likely to be counterproductive. A more fruitful policy direction is to encourage employment creation in new areas, and we therefore strongly support the government’s intention to ease the burden of regulation on businesses, particularly in the SME sector. It is also important that steps are taken to mitigate the impact on those people who lose their jobs, and initiatives to broaden job retraining programmes and to ensure that the social safety net is adequate are therefore very welcome.
9. In sum, Kazakhstan continues to face considerable economic challenges and the coming months will not be easy. Nevertheless, the government has developed a bold strategy for dealing with the current economic and financial difficulties. As it moves ahead with its plans, it will be important that the government clearly communicates the details and objectives of its policies and works with all stakeholders to ensure consistent and comprehensive implementation. Progress in implementing the programme should be monitored closely to ensure the intended goals are being achieved and reports should be made publicly available at regular intervals. Samruk-Kazyna will need to provide a full and regular accounting of its operations given its central role in the programme.